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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper finds that countries which practice democracy are less prone to unequal 
outcomes especially when it comes to wage inequality and income inequality whereas 
autocracy is associated with higher level of wage inequalities but its impact on 
income inequalities are insignificant. Though under good economic management, 
autocracies may redistribute incomes from the richest to the poorest, more generally 
an autocratic set up violates the median voter hypothesis.  The results also show that 
political stability and voice and accountability are more sensitive to inequalities than 
democracy and autocracy which is to say that the countries which are politically 
stable and practice accountability also form more equal societies.  
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1. Introduction: 
 
 
In an effort to achieve economic efficiency, most countries have dismantled their 
barriers to international trade in goods and services during the last couple of decades. 
As a result, the size of world trade in goods and services has dramatically increased. 
Few success stories have also emerged as an outcome of contemporary globalisation. 
China and India, have witnessed unprecedented rise in their growth rates as well as 
significant poverty alleviation. However for most countries, globalisation has come 
with mixed experiences. Most rich and middle income countries are experiencing 
rising economic inequality generated by skill biased technological change, 
international trade and other factors related to globalisation (Smeeding, 2002).  
Despite integration to the world economy, most countries of Latin America, Africa 
(i.e, Sub Saharan Africa) and some in Asia have failed to accomplish decent growth 
rates. In many countries in the South, poverty has increased. Even if some could grow 
at a decent rate, they have failed to put a downward pressure on the increasing trends 
 2
in poverty levels. Even in China and India, the falling poverty trends are not 
sustainable, as there is an evidence of rapid rising inequalities.  
 
Though the world after the very surge of colonialism transformed into a land of 
unequal opportunities, last century has witnessed a worse deal where global 
inequalities have partly lead to regional inequalities and then the come back of 
contemporary globalisation entailing post modernism had brought inequality to the 
very door step of each country where rural and urban divides have been ever 
increasing so much so that recently it has become of policy importance to consider 
inequality as a significant factor which may stifle growth promoting strategies and 
even reverse what good growth may bring to the society.  
 
In the retrospect, the problem of poverty can not be separated from the way in which 
growth is achieved. So, other than economic growth, what is the point of reference to 
economic development especially when it is about ensuring equity? Under global 
processes of production where trading societies learn and coordinate among each 
other to find common grounds for carrying out contemporary social norms which fits 
into international standards where business protects labour rights, promotes gender 
sensitivity, brings efficient social welfare system while following best commerce 
practices, there are myriad of common institutions which simultaneously play a role 
in facilitating each country’s smooth exposure to global markets and international 
competition.  
 
 One of the most commonly quoted institutional factor for determining any country’s 
intellectual, social, economic and cultural progress is the notion of Democracy. Since 
all developed nations are well practiced democracies, this notion generally forms the 
popular opinion that democracy is the first step to any country’s progress.  
  
Thus to analyse what makes it tick for good economics where not only economic 
growth is achieved but its economic dividends are also distributed equally among 
different strata of population especially in case of developing countries, a cross 
section analysis of developed and developing countries has been carried out in this 
paper where different definitions of political institutions are employed to analyse their 
impact on inequality while different proxies of openness/trade policy capture the free 
market effect and would also work as a control group to confirm the robustness of 
results.  
 
 
2. Data and Methodology:  
 
To capture inequality we not only take GINI income inequality index (Gini) from 
UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) but also we employ UTIP-
UNIDO Theil measure (Theil) calculated by University of Texas Inequality Project 
(UTIP) which captures wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labour. This is 
motivated by several considerations. First, comparable and consistent measures of 
income inequality, whether on a household level or per head basis are difficult, almost 
implausible and generally fails to provide adequate or accurate longitudinal and cross-
country coverage. On the other hand, inequality of manufacturing pay, based on 
UNIDO Industrial Statistics provides indicators of inequality that are more stable, 
more reliable and more comparable across countries because UNIDO measures are 
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based on a two or three digit code of International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC) a single systematic accounting framework. Furthermore, manufacturing pay 
has been measured with reasonable accuracy as a matter of official routine in most 
countries around the world for nearly forty years (Galbraith and Kum, 2002).   Further 
more we take income deciles and percentiles from UNU/WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) as other proxies of inequality. Institutions or Integration 
will be guilty of inequality if it has the negative impact on the incomes of  bottom 10 
percent (low10) and positive impact on the income of the top 10 percent (high 10).  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variables Code Source Obs Std . Dev 
Dependent     
GINI Coefficient in Percentage Points as calculated 
by WIDER, 1995 
Gini UNU/WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wi
id/wiid.htm 
117 (35.00) 
UTIP-UNIDO Wage Inequality THEIL Measure, 1999 Theil99 University of Texas 
Inequality Project (UTIP) 
http://utip.gov.utexas.edu 
155 (0.099) 
Lowest income decile, 1995 
 
Low10 UNU/WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wi
id/wiid.htm 
117 (1.05) 
Fifth income percentile/ First income percentile , 
1995 
High20/ 
Low20 
UNU/WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wi
id/wiid.htm 
117 (2.28) 
Third income percentile, 1995 Thrd20 UNU/WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wi
id/wiid.htm 
117 (2.22) 
Highest income decile, 1995 High10 UNU/WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wi
id/wiid.htm 
117 (7.50) 
Endogenous Independent     
Openness Variables     
(Exports +Imports)/GDP at current dollar prices, 
1985 
Lcopen World Development 
Indicators 
170 (0.589) 
Import Penetration: overall, 1985 Impnov85 Pritchett (1996) 96 (21.08) 
Import Penetration: overall, 1982 Impnov82 Pritchett (1996) 95 (23.85) 
TARS trade penetration,: overall, 1985 Tars85 Pritchett (1996) 96 (36.91) 
TARS trade penetration,: overall, 1982 Tars82 Pritchett (1996) 93 (83.10) 
     
Trade Policy Variables     
Import duties as % imports,1985 Tariffs World Development 
Indicators 
99 (8.903) 
Tariffs on international inputs and capital goods, 
1985 
Owti Sachs and Warner (1995) 98 (0.165 
Trade taxes/ trade, 1982 Txtrdg Pritchett (1996) 54 (0.031) 
Weighted average of total import charges, 1985 Totimpov85 Pritchett (1996) 
(Available for developing 
countries only) 
76 (21.30) 
Non trade barriers frequency on intermediate inputs, 
1985 
Owqi Sachs and Warner (1995) 96 (0.24) 
Non-tariff barriers Coverage: overall, 1987 Nontarr87 Pritchett (1996) 
(Available for developing 
countries only) 
76 (36.305) 
Sachs and Warner’s composite openness index, 
1980 
Open80s Edwards (1998) 61 (0.446) 
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Political Institutions     
Voice and Accountability, 1999 Range: 2.5 to -2.5 Va Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Lobaton(2003) 
170 (0.952) 
 
Political stability, 1999 
Range: 2.5 to -2.5 
 
Ps 
 
Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Lobaton(2003) 
 
156 
 
(0.954) 
 
Democracy, 2000 
Range = 0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high), Democracy Score: 
general openness of political institutions. The 11-point 
Democracy scale is constructed additively 
 
Demo 
 
Polity IV dataset 
 
123 
 
(4.33) 
 
Autocracy 
Range = 0 to -10 (0 = low; -10 = high), general 
closeness of political institutions. The 11-point 
autocracy scale is constructed additively 
 
Auto 
 
Polity IV dataset 
 
123 
 
(3.69) 
     
Instruments     
Natural logarithm of predicted trade shares computed 
from a bilateral trade equation with ‘pure geography’ 
variables, 
Lfrkrom Frankel and Romer (1999) 163 (16.75) 
 
Fraction of the population speaking English 
Engfrac Hall and Jones (1999) 182 (0.236) 
 
Fraction of the population speaking one of the major 
languages of Western Europe: French, German, 
Portugese or Spanish 
Eurfrac Hall and Jones (1999) 185 (0.380) 
     
     
Distance from the equator of capital city measured as 
abs (Latitude)/90 
Disteq Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (AJR) (2001) 
208 (16.65) 
 
 
We also take income groups divided into quintiles where the effect of Institutions is 
anticipated to be negative for the ratio between top 20 percent and bottom 20 percent 
(high20/low20) and positive for the middle income groups (Middle20). The exercise 
on income deciles and percentiles will further shed light on how institutions and 
integration are related with income distribution. Especially, we are interested to know 
how quality of institutions is related with the incomes of the middle class or the ones 
living in bottom of income share. Each country observation for all inequality 
measures is taken for the latest year for which data is available and in most cases 
represent inequality in mid 1990s. 
 
Four proxies for political institutions namely, political stability (Ps), voice and 
accountability (Va), democracy (Democ) and autocracy (Autoc) are used.  The 
analysis incorporates not 1 but 12 various concepts of openness and trade policy in 
regression model in order to carry out a robustness check for our results on 
institutions.  
 
The basic inequality and income share equations would look like: 
 
Inequality = f (Political Institutions, Integration, Geography) …………......... (1) 
 
and    Income Share= f (Political Institutions, Integration, Geography)………(2) 
 
Corresponding to equation 1, inequality model say based on Theil index has 1 
equation, whereas it corresponds to different institutional or integration combination. 
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Then, the model specifications for Gini, High20/Low20, Midlle20, Low10 and High10 
contain same classification of endogenous independent variables.  
 
iiiii GeoTradePolityTheil 111111 εδχβα ++++= ……………(3) 
 
The variable iTheil is Theil Index in a country i, iPolity  respectively measures for 
either political stability, voice and accountability, democracy or autocracy, whereas 
iTrade measures general openness or trade policy in the economy and iε  is the 
random error term. iGeo represent distance from the equator. 
 
There are potential endogenity problems between institutions and integration and 
between institutions and inequality itself. To this effect we have first regressed our 
institutional, trade policy and openness proxies on a set of instruments. Frankel and 
Romer (1999) suggests that we can instrument for openness by using trade/GDP 
shares constructed on the basis of a gravity equation for bilateral trade flows. 
Following Dollar and Kraay (2003) and Hall and Jones (1999), we use ‘fractions of 
the population speaking English (Engfrac) and Western European languages as the 
first language (Eurfrac)’ as an instrument for political institutions. As in Rodrik et al 
(2004), we employ ‘distance from the equator’ as another instrument (proxy for 
geography) also employed by Hall and Jones (1999). Due to space constraints we 
directly jump to second stage results. First stage results are available on request. 
Suffice to say that the author runs higher order asymptotic tests and instruments 
mostly pass the criterion. 
 
3. Results:  
 
Due to the sheer number of specifications for which the regressions are carried out for 
six different dependent variables, it is not possible to present results for both 
institutions and integration together in single table. Thus, in order to cover all 
specifications, we discuss results by summarizing them into different categories of 
political institutions.  
 
Political stability generally measures conflict including military coup risk, major 
insurgency rebellion, political terrorism, political assassination, civil war, major urban 
riots and the new government honouring commitments of the previous government. 
(Kaufman et al. 2003) Although many recent studies show that conflict and civil 
unrest is endogenous to prevalent inequalities, it may also be that these conflicts 
further deepen inequalities in society. That this is exactly what happens as per the 
results in table 2. Political stability ensures a more equal society. High coefficients for 
Gini with negative signs and significance at 1% level in most cases show high 
effectiveness of political stability in decreasing income inequalities. Countries who 
address factors of instability and achieve greater social harmony among the 
population by addressing the concerns of marginalized can more effectively address 
the problem of rising income inequalities. 
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Table 2: Political Stability 
 Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables Wage 
Inequality 
(Theil) 
Income 
Inequality 
(Gini) 
 
High20/Low20 
 
Middle20 
 
Low10 
 
High10 
       
Political Stability (Lcopen) -0.03 -8.70 -6.39 2.19 0.58 -6.87 
 (-1.97)** (-4.98)*** (-3.57)*** (5.49)*** (3.11)*** (-5.10)*** 
Political Stability (Impnov85) -0.04 -8.71 -6.72 2.17 0.54 -6.68 
 (-2.23)** (-3.69)*** (-2.67)*** (4.03)*** (2.28)** (-3.69)*** 
Political Stability (Impnov82) -0.03 -8.38 -6.31 2.09 0.54 -6.47 
 (-1.76)* (-3.94)*** (-2.72)*** (4.20)*** (2.41)*** (-3.87)*** 
Political Stability (Tarshov85) -0.04 -9.10 -6.95 2.24 0.59 -6.91 
 (-2.41)** (-3.68)*** (-2.69)*** (3.99)*** (2.38)** (-3.68)*** 
Political Stability (Tarshov82) -0.04 -8.73 -6.54 2.17 0.57 -6.69 
 (-2.38)** (-3.90)*** (-2.70)*** (4.13)*** (2.48)** (-3.81)*** 
Political Stability (Open80s) -0.05 -15.04 -13.32 3.21 1.25 -10.64 
 (-1.14) (-2.40)*** (-1.95)* (2.80)*** (2.12)** (-2.70)*** 
Political Stability (Tariffs) -0.002 22.35 -13.51 4.32 2.69 -14.72 
 (-0.02) (-1.91)** (-1.59) (2.01)** (1.61) (-1.95)*** 
Political Stability (Owti) -0.07 -13.55 -7.36 2.84 1.09 -9.31 
 (-2.33)** (-2.83)*** (-2.27)** (3.13)*** (2.39)** (-2.94)*** 
Political Stability (Txtrdg) -0.03 -14.12 -8.26 3.25 1.14 -11.23 
 (-2.29)** (-3.49)*** (-2.09)** (3.64)*** (2.47)** (-3.54)*** 
Political Stability (Totimpov85) 0.0003 4.63 -4.33 -0.03 -0.69 1.45 
 (0.01) (0.78) (-0.55) (-0.03) (-1.05) (0.33) 
Political Stability (Owqi) -0.09 -2.84 -1.16 1.28 0.10 -3.40 
 (-1.10) (-0.37) (-0.23) (1.05) (0.17) (-0.75) 
Political Stability (Ntarfov87) -0.03 -16.61 -14.16 1.98 0.42 -5.59 
 (-0.42) (-0.93) (-1.19) (0.98) (0.44) (-0.82) 
-***, **, * corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
- Control variables are in parentheses in the first column 
 
In comparison to Gini, low coefficients of Ps for Theil99 suggest that good politics 
has a limited role to play for smoothening out the average wage rate in favor of 
unskilled. Nevertheless, for a sample of developed and developing countries, a 
negative relationship between Theil99 and Ps means that politically stable economies, 
which are also democracies in most instances pay higher average wages in labor 
markets thus putting a downward pressure on wage inequality. (Rodrik, 1998) For 
businesses to perform better, stable political landscape is a pre-requisite. All 
politically stable economies also have thriving manufacturing sectors with profitable 
industries and high rates of employment - both skilled and unskilled. All such 
countries would also pay relatively higher wages to unskilled due to, probably, higher 
profits and thus a downward pressure is exerted on relative wage gap. There is a 
strong redistributive effect present for Ps which further suggests that internal conflict 
resolution leads to populist governance structures which redistribute resources from 
the very rich to the lesser. Opposite of political stability – occurrence of internal 
conflict may indicate towards power struggle between different interest groups or 
different classes which would then be highly correlated with concentration of wealth 
in the hands of the few elites. The results suggest that politically stable societies not 
only redistribute incomes to the middle-income groups, but they also benefit the 
lowest segments of society equally as coefficients of low10 are close to the half of the 
coefficients for Middle 20.  
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Table 3  
Voice and Accountability 
 Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables Wage 
Inequality 
(Theil) 
Income 
Inequality 
(Gini) 
High20/Low20 Middle20 Low10 High10 
       
Voice and Accountability (Lcopen) -0.02 -5.46 -4.04 1.43 0.259 -4.37 
 (-1.50) (-4.04)*** (-2.92)*** (4.74)*** (1.71)* (-4.20)*** 
Voice and Accountability (Impnov85) -0.03 -5.28 -4.53 1.39 0.17 -3.99 
(-2.07)** (3.03)*** (-2.28)** (3.38)*** (0.87) (-2.82)*** 
Voice and Accountability(Impnov82) -0.02 -5.63 -4.29 1.51 0.26 -4.50 
(-1.64)* (-3.34)*** (-2.62)*** (4.05)*** (1.49) (-3.51)*** 
Voice and Accountability (Tarshov85) -0.03 -5.35 -4.68 1.42 0.187 -4.07 
(-2.27)** (-2.96)*** (-2.25)** (3.31)*** (0.91) (-2.76)*** 
Voice and Accountability(Tarshov82) -0.04 -5.60 -4.81 1.52 0.28 -4.48 
(-2.48)** (-3.43)** (-2.57)** (3.91)*** (1.51) (-3.37)*** 
Voice and Accountability (Open80s) -0.06 -4.20 -6.18 1.13 -0.11 -3.01 
(-1.12) (-1.21) (-1.28) (1.54) (-0.24) (-1.14) 
Voice and Accountability (Tariffs) -0.05 -19.34 -16.18 3.91 2.34 -11.68 
 (-0.75) (-1.05) (-0.90) (1.10) (0.89) (-1.05) 
Voice and Accountability (Owti) -0.05 -5.80 -4.14 1.50 0.23 -4.39 
 (-2.21)** (-2.11)** (-1.42) (2.13)** (0.64) (-1.81)* 
Voice and Accountability (Txtrdg) 0.08 -12.74 -7.76 3.15 0.82 -10.76 
 (1.10) (-2.33)** (-1.58) (2.52)** (1.46) (-2.40)** 
Voice and Accountability(Totimpov85) 0.01 3.06 -0.34 -0.56 -0.69 2.59 
(0.47) (0.91) (-0.08) (-0.76) (-1.84)* (1.02) 
Voice and Accountability (Owqi) -0.07 0.70 0.924 0.27 -0.46 0.054 
 (-1.24) (0.09) (0.17) (0.17) (-0.52) (1.01) 
Voice and Accountability (Ntarfov87) -0.03 -0.61 -3.77 0.16 -0.26 -0.06 
(-0.67) (-0.14) (-0.72) (0.17) (-0.52) (-0.02) 
-***, **, * corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
- Control variables are in parentheses in the first column 
 
Internal conflicts can be resolved and political stability can be achieved only through 
a transparent political process which takes on board all stakeholders and give equal 
space to each to raise their respective concerns and by holding fair accountability for 
all. If rich can get away with accountability process through manipulation of justice 
system, then larger public discontent may lead to public unrest resulting in the 
possibility of a violent conflict where larger segments of the society would take law in 
their hands. Class struggles in many developing countries have lead to civil unrest and 
cause internal conflict. The origins of many ethnic conflicts have also arisen due to 
lack of equal representation in sharing public offices and other positions of power by 
minorities. The root cause of every civil conflict links up with discontent which 
aggrieved parties show towards biased accountability process where one law is for the 
powerful and another is for the Junta. Results in table 3, indicate that voice and 
accountability is another important institutional process for an equal society. A strong 
evidence of redistribution is present in line with other empirical literature: ‘The 
channels of communication are vital for development, particularly for electoral 
democracies in the process of establishing effective political and economic institutions. In 
societies where press freedom is combined with widespread access to mass media, this is 
positively associated with good governance and with human development, through the 
role of the press in promoting the voice of disadvantaged groups in the policymaking 
process and strengthening the accountability of governments to citizens and thus 
decreasing inequality.’ (Norris 2001: 8).  
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Table 4: Democracy 
 Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables Wage 
Inequality 
(Theil) 
Income 
Inequality 
(Gini) 
High20/Low20 Middle20 Low10 High10 
       
Democracy (Lcopen) -0.004 -0.77 -0.649 0.23 -0.01 -0.63 
 (-1.65)* (-1.84)* (-1.66)* (2.68)*** (-0.25) (-2.15)** 
Democracy (Impnov85) -0.005 -0.69 -0.79 0.21 -0.01 -0.51 
 (-1.73)* (-1.84)* (-1.65)*** (2.13)** (-0.02) (-1.56) 
Democracy (Impnov82) -0.004 -0.88 -0.915 0.27 0.02 -0.74 
 (-1.94)* (-2.20)** (-1.99) (2.93)*** (0.36) (-2.41)** 
Democracy (Tarshov85) -0.006 -0.62 -0.79 0.19 -0.01 -0.45 
 (-1.77)* (-1.92)* (-1.56) (1.90)** (-0.27) (-1.33) 
Democracy (Tarshov82) -0.005 -0.91 -0.97 0.27 0.02 -0.73 
 (-1.50) (-2.15)** (-2.02)** (2.79)*** (0.51) (-2.27)** 
Democracy (Open80s) -0.007 0.56 -0.67 -0.02 -0.17 0.34 
 (-1.15) (0.57) (-0.67) (-0.11) (-1.32) (0.48) 
Democracy (Tariffs) -0.01 2.09 0.43 -0.39 -0.24 1.58 
 (-1.81)* (0.95) (0.33) (-0.81) (-1.10) (0.92) 
Democracy (Owti) -0.007 0.33 0.13 -0.05 -0.13 0.41 
 (-1.99)** (0.38) (0.19) (-0.24) (-1.12) (0.53) 
Democracy (Txtrdg) 0.023 -1.83 -1.16 0.52 0.06 -1.72 
 (1.14) (-1.80)* (-1.13) (2.20)** (0.55) (-2.06)** 
Democracy (Totimpov85) 0.0009 -1.35 0.59 0.24 0.19 0.97 
 (0.17) (-2.25)** (0.74) (1.84)* (2.86)*** (2.11)** 
Democracy (Owqi) -0.01 0.74 0.40 -0.07 -0.13 0.458 
 (-1.87)* (0.37) (0.06) (-0.17) (-0.72) (0.31) 
Democracy (Ntarfov87) -0.007 0.96 0.44 -0.19 -0.12 1.52 
 (-1.13) (1.30) (0.85) (-1.28) (-1.50) (-0.61) 
-***, **, * corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
- Control variables are in parentheses in the first column 
 
 
According to Glaeser et al. (2004), good leadership is what matters and not whether a 
country is a democracy or a dictatorship. Irrespective to their convincing argument, 
there is a strong correlation run from democracy to redistribution through political 
stability: ‘Regimes controlled by rich elite often collapse and make way for democracy 
amidst widespread social unrest. Such regime changes are often followed by 
redistribution to the poor at the expense of the former elite.’ (p683) Our empirical 
analysis also finds that democracy is significantly and negatively related with income 
inequality, but the relation is indeed weak as can be seen by the low coefficients of 
Demo for Gini. In comparison to other measures of political institutions, a high 
number of cases of insignificance are observed in table 4.  
 
 A comparison of results for Auto in table 5 and Demo in table 4 for Theil99 suggests 
that democracies put a downward pressure on wage inequality while autocracies may 
favor skilled over unskilled. In light of redistributive potential of democracy, this 
result shows presence of skill bias among autocracies. Since a comparison is drawn 
between democracies and autocracies for a sample of developed and developing 
countries, this result on autocracies is more relevant for developing countries that may 
represent dictatorships who may promote such growth policies which would have 
unequal outcomes in labor markets. Literature also suggests that differentiation 
between political make-ups is important in determining the wage structure in a 
country. For example, democracies on average pay higher wages to the manufacturing 
sector. Rodrik (1999) finds out that average wages improve in the manufacturing 
sector with the enhancement of democratic institutions: ‘average wages in a country 
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like Mexico would be expected to increase by 10 to 40 percent were Mexico to attain a 
level of democracy comparable to that prevailing in United States.’ (p.707) Rockey 
(2007) adds up to this evidence as he finds that it is parliamentary democracies that 
are more effective in raising the average wage share of labor in manufacturing when 
compared to Presidential democracies.  
Table 5: Autocracy 
 Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables Wage 
Inequality 
(Theil) 
Income 
Inequality 
(Gini) 
High20/Low20 Middle20 Low10 High10 
       
Autocracy (Lcopen) 0.006 0.37 0.70 -0.17 0.07 0.38 
 (1.64)* (0.70) (1.11) (-1.49) (1.23) (0.98) 
Autocracy (Impnov85) 0.006 0.43 0.92 -0.16 0.06 0.29 
 (1.35) (0.75) (1.45) (-1.20) (0.96) (0.65) 
Autocracy (Impnov82) 0.0041 0.69 0.64 -0.26 0.03 0.63 
 (1.85)* (1.20) (0.97) (-1.94)* (0.49) (1.43) 
Autocracy (Tarshov85) 0.006 0.29 0.94 -0.12 0.07 0.17 
 (1.65)* (0.49) (1.43) (-0.92) (1.06) (0.37) 
Autocracy (Tarshov82) 0.005 0.63 -0.19 -0.23 0.02 0.55 
 (1.84)* (1.08) (-0.18) (-1.74)* (0.38) (1.22) 
Autocracy (Open80s) 0.004 -1.69 -0.47 0.26 0.27 -1.16 
 (0.75) (-1.47) (-0.38) (1.11) (2.02)** (-1.39) 
Autocracy (Tariffs) 0.01 -1.899 -0.71 0.361 0.21 -1.14 
 (2.39)** (-1.19) (-0.75) (1.00) (1.38) (-1.15) 
Autocracy (Owti) 0.008 -1.13 -0.55 0.23 0.22 -1.04 
 (2.04)** (-0.96) (-0.34) (0.77) (1.60) (-1.04) 
Autocracy (Txtrdg) -0.02 -0.70 -0.88 -0.04 0.25 -0.03 
 (-0.97) (-0.46) (-0.93) (-0.12) (1.28) (-0.03) 
Autocracy (Totimpov85) 0.0002 -1.78 -0.62 -0.31 0.23 -1.28 
 (0.04) (-2.43)** (-0.44) (-2.07)** (2.88)* (-2.34)** 
Autocracy (Owqi) 0.011 -0.10 -0.25 0.13 0.18 -0.68 
 (1.88)* (-0.45) (-0.62) (0.26) (0.91) (-0.40) 
Autocracy (Ntarfov87) 0.008 -1.27 -0.44 0.27 0.16 -1.11 
 (1.86)* (-1.54) (-0.25) (1.59) (1.64) (-1.83)* 
-***, **, * corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
- Control variables are in parentheses in the first column 
 
Coming back to the results on autocracy, they reveal that autocracies also perform 
poorly in favor of redistribution and if anything they are negatively related with the 
incomes of the poor and the middle class. In contrast, democracies seem to favor 
middle-class more than anybody else, confirming the median voter argument that 
democratized countries with greater inequality of factor income tend to redistribute 
from more to the less affluent. (Milanovic 2000)  
 
4. Conclusions: 
 
So what lessons are available from these results? Should it be that a country might 
compromise on democracy and follow a politically repressed system of dictatorial 
rule? Both questions are applicable to developing countries where most of the 
underperforming economies are lead by dictatorial regimes whether in Asia, Africa or 
Latin America. However, there are salient exceptions too where it seems that the 
definition of western democracy remains unfulfilled but an enlightened model of 
economic management has been adopted and success has been achieved as far as 
growth dividends are concerned. So how may one contrast such exceptions with the 
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ones where autocracy has lead to repressed market structures? Is it all about market 
efficiency to defend an autocratic structure? The present results illuminate these 
questions of whether equity and not only growth is the objective for a developing 
country’s policy apparatus. If somehow a less democratic political system may 
strengthen legal, social and economic institutions and promote political stability, it 
would not matter whether a western model of democracy is implemented by its word 
and spirit or some case specific combination of political and social methodologies 
adopted.  
 
Democracy is definitely not a sufficient condition in itself for contributing towards the 
equity or even economic progress of a country. Rather democracy is just another part 
of the jigsaw puzzle, which may only fit in properly at its right time when other 
institutional variables have evolved appropriately to support its conceptual 
application. Most democracies must have been autocracies or near autocracies when 
the political process started out and this means mere concentration on democracy is 
futile to find solutions for institutional or macroeconomic progress. Rather consider 
democracy a notion suggesting an objective and well-developed end for the 
confirmation of economic, social, cultural and scientific development rather than a 
means to an end. However, in today’s rapidly transforming world where some 
developing countries may benefit from global markets more than others, they would 
find themselves under increasing pressure from their populations to transform into a 
more democratized system of governance once they witnessed higher levels of 
economic and institutional development. In such scenarios, countries that may be 
doing well under well-defined autocratic set ups may not only have to decide to bring 
western models of democracy to align their social development with global standards, 
but more importantly, they have to decide the timing of such critical transitions. This 
will ensure the sustainability of the economic progress they achieved as any abrupt 
changes always carry higher risks. (Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005) 
 
Nevertheless, all such autocratic regimes which are controlled by ruling elites have a 
high risk of collapse amidst widespread social unrest. Thus it is beneficial for the 
ruling class to bring increased democratization in the country because temporary 
concessions in light of social pressure can be viewed as a sign of weakness and this 
may give way to further unrest and cause dramatic change in regimes and increasing 
the risk of a civil war unless the most generous concession, a transition to full 
democracy, is not made. Finally, democratization lies in the very interest of autocracy 
while the transition to democracy is often followed by redistribution to the poor at the 
expense of the former elite. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000)  
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